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COMMENTS
ming pool. Plaintiff maintained that the homeowner's mother,
who had given the youth permission to swim in the pool, was
the servant of the homeowner and liability was imputable to
the homeowner under a master-servant relationship. The First
Circuit decided the mother was a non-servant agent of the
homeowner, empowered only to maintain the property, and thus
no liability was imputable to either her son or his insurer. It is
submitted that such a result is correct and an examination of
the relationship involved will yield a proper result in every
case embracing the doctrine of respondeat superior.
John S. Odom, Jr.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS IN LOUISIANA
The Declaratory Judgments Act1 has been the source of
considerable confusion for both the courts and the practicing
bar. This apparently has stemmed from a misunderstanding of
the basic nature of declaratory relief, the nature of the action.2
Basically, a declaratory judgment declares the rights, status
or legal relations of the parties.8 It gives a party a remedy that
supplements the remedies heretofore available, and differs from
a conventional remedy in that while a conventional remedy is
accompanied by a granting of damages or other relief, the declar-
atory judgment stands alone: 4
"The conventional type of judgment embodies two ele-
ments: (1) an ascertainment or declaration of the rights
of the parties (usually implied); and (2) a specific award
of relief. The declaratory judgment embodies only the
first element which, of course, is always express."5
Thus, declaratory relief can be viewed as a lesser form of relief
1. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 1871-83. This legislation Is modeled on the Uni-
form Declaratory Judgments Act and bears a close resemblance to the fed-
eral declaratory judgments statutes as well as the legislation in other states
based on the uniform act.
2. This Comment does not purport to examine all phases of the Declara-
tory Judgments Act. It attempts to deal with some of the basic concepts
underlying declaratory judgments so as to aid the practitioner in utilizing
them.
3. Succession of Rickerfor, 120 So.2d 320 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1960).
4. E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 25 (1941); Succession of Ricker-
for, 120 So.2d 320 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1960).
5. LA. CODE Civ, P. art. 1871, comment.
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where the plaintiff receives only a portion of what he would
have received under a conventional judgment.
The nature of the remedy has far-reaching consequences on
the action. To be entitled to conventional relief, a plaintiff must
show that the defendant has acted, has failed to act, or is
threatening immediate action which poses the threat of irrepa-
rable harm." Declaratory relief, because of its nature, makes it
possible to adjudicate a grievance at an earlier time than would
otherwise be allowed. The relief becomes anticipatory to the
performance or imminent threat of performance of a harmful
act by the prospective defendant.7 The remedy becomes avail-
able when a claim against the interest of the prospective plain-
tiff comes into existence; the declaration merely enunciates the
rights of the parties as they then exist without purporting to
award damages or restrain activity. As stated in Code of Civil
Procedure article 1881,8 the purpose of declaratory judgments is
to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity.
Thus, the existence of declaratory relief makes actionable the
legal uncertainty or insecurity of the plaintiff.
Recognition of such a situation as allowing an interested
person to sue gives rise to a type of action heretofore unknown
under the conventional remedies.9 A party who would be a
defendant in a conventional lawsuit can, at times, seek a declara-
tion of nonliability, arguing that the existence of a claim adverse
to his interest has placed him in a position of uncertainty, and
thus entitles him to a declaratory judgment. In this anticipa-
tory type of action a declaratory judgment is an exclusive reme-
dy since the right to relief is based solely on the declaratory
judgments statutes. This type of action for a declaratory judg-
ment can therefore be viewed as a pure declaratory judgment.
6. Ordinary conventional remedies, such as judgments for damages, con-
template a plaintiff having suffered harm at the time the action is brought.
Extraordinary remedies, such as injunctive relief, are anticipatory but con-
template the threat of immediate action with irreparable harm where no
other adequate remedy exists. See LA. CODH Civ. P. art. 3601.
7. E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 28 (1941); Lee, The Declaratory
Judgments Act, 20 TUL. L. Ra. 566 (1946).
8. LA. CODE Cirv. P. art. 1881: "Their purpose is to settle and afford relief
from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other
legal relations, and they are to be liberally construed and administered."
9. E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 19-20 (1941). Examples of the
use of this procedure in Louisiana are: Burton v. Lester, 227 La. 347, 79 So.2d
333 (1955); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Roger Wilson, Inc., 252 So.2d 161 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1971); Marathon Ins. Co. v. Warner, 244 So.2d 353 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1971).
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However, a declaratory judgment may be an alternative
remedy. Borchard states that the fact "that no coercive decree
is sought . . .enables actions to be brought for a declaratory
judgment on two different types of operative facts: (a) those
which might also have justified an action for an executory
(coercive) judgment or decree, or (b) those which are not sus-
ceptible of any other relief."10 When a declaratory judgment is
requested on facts which would justify an action for a conven-
tional judgment, the declaratory remedy is alternative." Pre-
sumably, when a plaintiff asks only for declaratory instead of
executory relief, he is, for whatever reason, satisfied with the
lesser remedy and should be granted the relief unless the pur-
pose and function of the Declaratory Judgments Act cannot be
accomplished.
Although the nature of declaratory relief has had a pro-
found effect on the nature of the action, the form of the action
has not been altered and is that of an ordinary action:
"[T]he conditions of the usual action, procedural and sub-
stantive, must always be present, namely, the competence or
jurisdiction of the court over the parties and subject-matter,
the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued, the adoption
of the usual forms for conducting judicial proceedings (in-
cluding process, pleadings, and evidence), the existence of
operative facts justifying judicial declaration of the legal
consequences, the assertion against an interested party of
rights capable of judicial protection, and a sufficient legal
interest in the moving party to entitle him to invoke a
judgment in his behalf."' 2
Professor McMahon in the official comments to article 1871
states: "There is actually no such thing as a declaratory action,
even if the sole relief prayed for is a declaratory judgment.
The action is identical, regardless of whether greater or lesser
relief is prayed for; the difference is only as to the type of
judgment to be rendered." s
A declaratory judgment should be regarded as an additional
10. E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 26 (1941).
11. Id. at 27.
12. Id. at 26 (1941).
13. IA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1871. But see Vignes v. Jarreau, 222 So.2d 566(La. App. 1st Cir. 1969), in which the court reasoned that an action for a
declaratory judgment is in the nature of a summary proceeding.
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remedy, subject to the rules governing ordinary proceedings,
which because of its nature creates a right of action at a point
in time when the case would not be cognizable by a court ap-
plying traditional remedies. Although it differs from conven-
tional remedies in that specific relief is not awarded as a matter
of course, the proper view is that declaratory relief is in the
nature of ordinary conventional relief rather than an extra-
ordinary remedy such as an injunction. Thus, declaratory relief
should be available to the plaintiff at any time provided that
grounds for discretionary refusal to grant the declaration do
not exist. Conversely, the granting of declaratory relief should
not be contingent upon the absence of another adequate remedy
such as an injunction.14
Justiciable Controversy: Adversity of Parties
In an action for a declaratory judgment, just as in an action
for any other type of judgment, the question presented to the
court must pose a justiciable controversy.15 The courts have
stated repeatedly that they will not decide moot' 6 or remote
questions, nor give advisory opinions.17
Although the fact that a declaratory judgment is prayed for
has the effect of making litigation possible at an earlier time
than it could ordinarily be commenced,' 8 the fact that a declara-
tory judgment is requested does not relax the standards of
justiciability;19 rather, a new standard is imposed to determine
when an actual controversy exists. In situations where a de-
claratory judgment is ordinarily an alternative remedy, i.e.,
where plaintiff would be justified on the facts in seeking a con-
14. See LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 3601. A comparison of the language of the
injunction provision with that of article 1871 clearly indicates the different
scope of the remedies.
15. Abbott v. Parker, 259 La. 279, 249 So.2d 908 (1971); Stoddard v. City
of New Orleans, 246 La. 417, 165 So.2d 9 (1964); Orleans Parish School Bd.
v. City of New Orleans, 238 La. 748, 116 So.2d 509 (1959); Superior Oil Co.
v. Reily, 234 La. 621, 100 So.2d 888 (1958); State v. Board of Supervisors,
La. State Univ., 228 La. 951, 84 So.2d 597 (1955); Tugwell v. Board of
Highways, 228 La. 662, 83 So.2d 893 (1955).
16. Tugwell v. Board of Highways, 228 La. 662, 83 So.2d 893 (1955).
17. Stoddard v. City of New Orleans, 246 La. 417, 165 So.2d 9 (1964).
But see Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. California Co., 241 La. 915, 132 So.2d 845
(1961).
18. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
19. E. BORCHARD, DECLATORY JUDGMENTS 33 (1941).
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ventional remedy, justiciability is not usually an issue.20 How-
ever, where only declaratory relief is available, the concept of
justiciable controversy is practically merged with the issue of
the existence of a cause of action. To a large degree the existence
of a justiciable controversy means that the plaintiff has a cause
of action due to the fact that declaratory relief makes legal
uncertainty or insecurity actionable.2 1
In Tugwell v. Members of Board of Highways,22 a justiciable
controversy was defined as being a specific adversary question
or controversy, asserted by interested parties, and based on an
existing state of fact. The issue presented must not be academic,
theoretical, or based upon a contingency which may or may
not arise. Recently in Abbot v. Parker,2 8 a justiciable controversy
was defined as an actual and substantial dispute, which involves
the legal relations of parties having real adverse interests, upon
which the judgment of the court may effectively operate through
a decree of a conclusive character. Further, the dispute should
be of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance
of a declaratory judgment.
The determination of when an actual controversy comes
into existence turns upon the difference between the justiciable
controversy problem in a suit for a declaratory judgment and
a conventional suit. Actual controversy concerns both adversity
and whether there is sufficient relationship between the interest
of the plaintiff and the claim, action, or position of the defen-
dant.2 4 Sufficiency of the relationship exists when the defendant's
position has an effect upon plaintiff that is legally cognizable.
In a conventional suit, the requirement for an actual controversy
is satisfied if the plaintiff has suffered harm or is immediately in
danger of suffering harm. In an action for a declaratory judg-
ment the standard becomes a determination of whether defen-
dant's position places plaintiff in a state of uncertainty so that
20. The problem generally does not arise in these situations because the
controversy, by maturing, fits easily within the traditional concepts de-
termining justiciable controversies.
21. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 1871, 1880; E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
28 (1941).
22. 228 La. 662, 83 So.2d 893 (1955). Here the court gave a declaration
as to one question presented, concerning the validity of a statute, and
then refused to consider a second question. The court reasoned that de-
cision of the first question rendered the second contingent upon facts that
might not arise and thus it was not justiciable.
23. 259 La. 279, 249 So.2d 908 (1971).
24. E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 40 (1941).
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if defendant acts in accordance with his position, plaintiff's
interest will be affected. In other words, is plaintiff actually
in a state of legal uncertainty?
The cases in which the courts have denied relief due to the
absence of an actual controversy generally follow the principles
enunciated above.25 In Abbott v. Parker, 6 the court found no
possibility of a dispute where payment of the domed stadium
indebtedness could not interfere with payment of the state's
other bonded indebtedness since present and projected state
revenue was more than sufficient for bond retirement purposes.
In Stoddard v. City of New Orleans,7 a permissive state industry
promotion statute which needed local approval to become effec-
tive did not give rise to an actual controversy where no steps to
implement the statute had been taken or were planned locally.
In Watermeier v. Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District,28
a complaint that bonds could not be sold within authorized
interest rates because of market conditions was held not to be
an actual controversy absent an attempt to sell the bonds at an
interest rate in excess of that authorized.
In Theodus v. City of Bossier City, the plaintiff sued to have
his establishment declared a restaurant within the terms of the
state closing law. The court denied declaratory relief, finding no
actual controversy where the statute was not being enforced
against plaintiff.29 This result seems clearly contrary to both
25. In the following cases the court found the existence of an actual
justiciable controversy: Plebst v. Barnwell, 243 La. 874, 148 So.2d 584 (1963)
(an attack upon the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance); Fields v.
Transtates Petro., Inc., 246 So.2d 887 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971) (a declaration
of rights under a sheriff's deed); Porter v. Hawkins, 240 So.2d 912 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1970) (declaration of the invalidity of an out-of-state divorce
decree); Baddock v. State, Dept. of Highways, 142 So.2d 448 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1962) (attack upon the validity of an expropriation statute); Theodos
v. City of Bossier City, 106 So.2d 851 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958) (validity of a
city closing ordinance); Schreiner v. Weil Furniture Co., 68 So.2d 149 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1953) (seeking a declaration of rights under the terms of a
contract).
26. 259 La. 279, 249 So.2d 908 (1971). A number of issues were presented
to the court; some were disposed of by the finding of no actual controversy,
while others were found not to present a controversy of sufficient immediacy
to justify judicial resolution. This is the only Louisiana decision which
predicates the lack of a justiciable controversy on lack of immediacy.
27. 246 La. 417, 165 So.2d 9 (1964).
28. 235 So.2d 114 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
29. 106 So.2d 851 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958). The court would have been
correct if the statute had been in effect for some time and had never been
enforced.
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the concept of an actual controversy under an action for a
declaratory judgment and the express language of article 1872.8
The fact that he claimed a right under a statute and the state
refused to accede to that claim would seem to present an actual
controversy.
Several cases which the courts have declared moot because
an actual controversy did not exist demonstrate the ability of
the judiciary to render ineffectual the benefits of the declaratory
judgments statutes.8 1 In each case the appellate court declared
the question moot where defendant had continued his activities
and they were completed by the time of the appellate hearing.
It is submitted that this situation is not properly one of lack of
actual controversy merely because the defendant has completed
his activities and declaratory relief alone is no longer sufficient.
The courts should have decided the cases on the merits and issued
a declaration; if the plaintiffs prevailed the declaration would
have been the basis for supplemental relief under article 1878.
Justiciable Controversy: Real Interest of Parties
Another requirement for a justiciable controversy is that the
parties have a real interest in the matter being litigated.2 The
concept of interest of the parties is substantially the same in a
suit for a declaratory judgment as in any other type of action.88
The attorney general was held to have no interest in having state
30. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1872: "A person . . . whose rights, status, or
other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, con-
tract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or
validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or fran-
chise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations
thereunder."
31. A to Z Paper Co. v. State Bd. of Educ., 251 So.2d 643 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1971) (bid to supply materials; by the time of appeal the contract had
been performed and the court considered the question moot); Wilshire
South Ass'n v. Jefferson Parish Zoning Appeals Bd., 181 So.2d 866 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1966) (action to have the court interpret a parish zoning ordinance;
building complained of was complete when appeal was heard, question
moot); Graham v. St. Rita Roman Catholic Church, 146 So.2d 666 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1962) (question of propriety of building in violation of a
restrictive covenant held moot after building completed and occupied).
In Baddock v. State, Dept. of Htghways, 142 So.2d 448 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1962), the defendant continued its activities in the face of a suspensive
appeal and received a sharp rebuke from the court. This would seem to
indicate that the suspensive appeal is the proper procedural device to pre-
vent defendant from rendering the case moot while on appeal.
32. Abbott v. Parker, 259 La. 279, 249 So.2d 908 (1971); Tugwell v. Board
of Highways, 228 La. 662, 83 So.2d 893 (1955).
33. E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 50 (1941).
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statutes declared constitutional in State v. Board of Super-
visors.8 4 There the court served notice that the declaratory judg-
ment procedure was not to be used by the state to obtain advisory
opinions on the constitutionality of statutes. Superior Oil Co. v.
Reily85 held a lessee had no interest where the state had a royalty
interest by deed of donation and the lessee questioned whether
severance taxes were due on the state's share. In Petition of
Sewage & Water Board,88 the court found no justiciable contro-
versy where the defendant disclaimed its interest in the litiga-
tion. Hasting v. McDoweZl s7 held a judgment creditor lacked
sufficient interest to bring an action for a declaratory judgment
to have property in the debtor's wife's name declared community
property. In Gerriero v. City of Monroe,8 a lessor lacked suffi-
cient interest to attack a city closing ordinance where the lessee
had informed the lessor of his intent not to renew the lease
because of the closing ordinance. The court reasoned that since
the lease contained no terms concerning the right to sell alcohol
at all hours, the lessor was affected only indirectly and thus
lacked sufficient interest. Generally, problems with respect to
justiciable controversies differ in no material respect whether a
declaratory judgment or some other remedy is involved; how-
ever, the issue is raised more often due to the low threshold of
the action necessary for a declaratory judgment.
Scope of Declaratory Relief
The terms of article 1871,89 the general grant of authority to
34. State v. Board of Supervisors, La. State Univ., 228 La. 951, 84 So.2d
597 (1955). Apparently the reasoning upon which the lack of interest of
the attorney general is based is that the constitutionality of a statute is
presumed until declared otherwise and thus the state, its officers or its
citizens have no interest in having a statute declared constitutional.
35. 234 La. 621, 100 So.2d 888 (1958).
36. 248 La. 169, 177 So.2d 276 (1965). The Sewage and Water Board,
citing the City of New Orleans as defendant, sought to have a constitutional
amendment authorizing a bond issue declared valid. The city disclaimed
any interest in the matter. The court held there was no justiciable con-
troversy. Although this case turned on the lack of interest by the defendant,
perhaps it can also be aligned with the cases holding that officials have no
interest in having statutes or other enactments declared constitutional.
37. 75 So.2d 383 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954). It is not entirely clear to what
extent this decision is based upon lack of Interest because the court also
reasoned that plaintiff had another adequate remedy and the mood of the
times was that another adequate remedy precluded declaratory relief.
38. 136 So.2d 305 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
39. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1871: "Courts of record within their respective
jurisdictions may declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether
or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall
[Vol. 33
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render declaratory judgments, disclose no inherent limitation as
to the types of cases in which declaratory judgments are proper.
Article 187540 indicates the expansive scope of the declaratory
judgment procedure by stating that the types of cases enumer-
ated in articles 1872, 1873, and 1874 are not exclusive.41 The
supreme court, in Petition of Sewage & Water Board,42 stated by
way of dicta that a declaratory judgment can be utilized in all
types of litigation. Thus, on its face, a declaratory judgment is
applicable to any type of case.
However, this position appears to be subject to at least two
exceptions. First, where the legislature has provided an exclu-
sive procedure for a certain type of case, an action for a declara-
tory judgment would be improper if it were not the procedure
so provided.48 The recent case of Vignes v. Jarreau44 appears to
be predicated on this principle. Plaintiff brought an action for a
declaratory judgment to establish a boundary between his prop-
erty and defendant's. He sought to prove the boundary by testi-
mony of a surveyor he had hired. The First Circuit held that
the statutes governing boundaries evidenced an intent that
actions for boundary could be determined only in ordinary
actions and an action for a declaratory judgment is in the nature
of a summary proceeding. The supreme court denied writs stat-
ing that the result was correct. The case has been criticized,
4 5
and appears to be an improper view of the nature of an action
be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree
Is prayed for; and the existence of another adequate remedy does not pre-
clude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate.
The declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment ordecree. "
40. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1875: "The enumeration in Articles 1872 through
1874 does not limit or restrict the exercise of the general powers conferred
In Article 1871 in any proceeding where declaratory relief Is sought, In
which a judgment or decree will terminate the controversy or remove an
uncertainty."
41. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1872 provides for declaratory relief with respect
to deeds, wills, contracts and ordinances or statutes. LA. CODE Civ. P. art.
1873 provides for declaration of contract rights before as well as after
breach. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1874 pertains to declaration of rights arising
out of relationships such as executors, trustees, creditors, etc.
42. 248 La. 169, 177 So.2d 276 (1965).
43. E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 342 (1941).
44. 222 So.2d 566 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
45. See The Work of the Louisiana AppeNate Courts for the 1968-1969
Term-Procedure, 30 LA. L. REv. 286, 294 (1970). Judge Tate argues that the
court Is In error. First, the procedure is not summary since It is not found in
the Code of Civil Procedure section on summary proceedings, and second,
the Civil Code does not prescribe a method of trying boundary cases but
only a method of proving or establishing boundaries.
1972]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
for a declaratory judgment and thus an improper application of
the principle.
The second possible exception concerns obtaining a declara-
tory judgment in a tort action based on negligence. In the federal
system and in many states there is a general policy against either
party securing a declaration of liability or non-liability in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances. 46
Although there is no Louisiana jurisprudence holding that
a declaratory judgment is improper in an action based on negli-
gence, Burton v. Lester47 contains dicta to the effect that an
action for a declaratory judgment should not be extended to
delicts or quasi delicts in the absence of extraordinary circum-
stances. This position is based generally on the proposition that
the plaintiff in a tort action should have his choice of forum and
time of confrontation, and when the matter is presented to the
court, it should be in a posture so that damages as well as liability
can be adjudicated in order to serve the purpose of judicial
efficiency.4
At the present time in Louisiana, it is impossible to ascertain
the precise scope of declaratory judgments because many types of
cases have yet to be presented to the courts in a declaratory judg-
ment context. However, since the revision of article 1871,41 the
courts have been increasingly liberal in permitting use of declar-
atory judgments so it is anticipated that they will eventually
give the procedure a wider scope in Louisiana.
Discretion of a Court to Deny Declaratory Relief
The scope of the declaratory judgments statutes is rather
broad, and thus relatively few cases will fall outside it so as to
46. Cunningham Bros., Inc. v. Bail, 407 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir. 1969); Sun
Oil Co. v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 108 F. Supp. 280 (E.D. Pa.
1952). The court in Sun Oil views the determination of liability in a suit
based on negligence as being normally outside the purposes of the declara-
tory judgments act; however, at times a declaratory judgment may be proper
if it serves the interest of justice or the convenience of the parties.
47. 227 La. 347, 79 So.2d 333 (1955). The continuing authority of this
case is of some doubt since the holding of the case was overruled legis-
latively by amendment of LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1871 in 1960. However, it is
quite likely that the courts today would refuse declaratory relief in negli-
gence cases, if not on the authority of Burton v. Lester, then perhaps on
authority from the federal system.
48. Cunningham Bros., Inc. v. Bail, 407 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir. 1969).
49. See note 53 infra and accompanying text.
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absolutely deny declaratory relief. However, an effective nar-
rowing of that scope is achieved through granting the courts
discretion not to entertain actions for declaratory relief. 50 Bor-
chard states:
"The two principal criteria guiding the policy in favor
of rendering declaratory judgments are (1) when the judg-
ment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling
the legal relations in issue, and (2) when it will terminate
and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and con-
troversy giving rise to the proceeding. It follows that when
neither of these results can be accomplished, the court should
decline to render the declaration prayed." 51
These principles are expressed in article 1876, which provides
that declaratory relief may be denied where it would not termi-
nate the uncertainty or controversy.5 2 In addition, language in
article 1871 has a bearing on discretion; the second sentence of
the article is to the effect that "the existence of another adequate
remedy will not preclude"58 declaratory relief where appropriate.
These two articles when read together describe the parameters
of the exercise of well-founded judicial discretion. Obviously,
discretion to refuse declaratory relief cannot be based merely on
the existence of another adequate remedy. The appropriateness
of declaratory relief is to be determined by the criteria of article
1876. Those criteria would seem to be whether or not the
declaratory judgment will terminate the controversy, or if the
declaratory judgment will settle an issue and serve a useful pur-
pose in clarifying the situation.
The Louisiana courts have yet to give a systematic inter-
pretation to articles 1876 and 1871 on this point. Some early
cases, which were decided on the lack of a justiciable contro-
versy, held that the granting of declaratory relief is a matter
solely within the discretion of the court, without setting any
50. See generaly Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (the court has the
discretion to hear an action for a declaratory judgment rather than the
litigant having a right to have it heard).
51. E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 299 (1941).
52. LA. CoDE Civ. P. art. 1876: "The Court may refuse to render a declara-
tory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered, would
not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding."
53. LA. CODE Civ. P. art 1871. This phrase was enacted to overrrule a
line of jurisprudence holding that existence of another adequate remedy
vested the court with discretion to refuse declaratory relief.
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standards.54 Later cases set forth vague standards55 which
amounted to little more than a reiteration of the language of
the code articles. In Huff v. Justice,56 the court predicated its
decision on article 1876 but based the discretionary refusal of
declaratory relief on a finding that the plaintiff lacked interest
in the matter. Certainly, this is reason for not granting relief,
but it is much more basic than discretion; it goes to the lack of
a justicable controversy.
The Louisiana courts have held on two occasions that hear-
ing a suit for a declaratory judgment was an abuse of dis-
cretion. In Burton v. Lester,5" the entertaining of a suit for a
declaratory judgment which presented issues before another
forum was held to be abuse.58 In Theodos v. City of Bossier
City,"9 where a criminal action pending against plaintiff in-
volved the same question as that posed in the action for a
declaratory judgment, the trial court was held to have abused
its discretion by hearing the civil action. Where a question has
already been submitted to a tribunal for resolution, an additional
suit in another forum serves no useful purpose and impedes
judicial efficiency. Therefore, both of these decisions appear to
be justified.
Further Relief Clause: Code of Civil Procedure Article 1871
As stated earlier, the nature of a declaratory judgment makes
54. Superior Oil Co. v. Reily, 234 La. 621, 100 So.2d 888 (1958); State v.
Board of Supervisors, La. State Univ., 228 La. 951, 84 So.2d 597 (1955).
55. Michell v. State Bd. of Optometry Examiners, 128 So.2d 825 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1961) and Rogers v. State Bd. of Optometry Examiners, 126
So.2d 628 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961), phrasingthe standards in terms of dis-
cretion to refuse where declaratory relief is not appropriate or definitive
under the circumstances.
In the federal system, the standards are stated as whether the declara-
tory judgment will settle the particular controversy and clarify legal re-
lations in issue. Sears, Roebuck Co. v. American Mut. Liab. Co., 372 F.2d
435 (7th Cir. 1967).
56. 174 So.2d 164 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965). The court reasoned that since
the plaintiff lacked interest, the grant of declaratory relief would not termi-
nate the controversy since the real party of interest would not be bound
by the decree.
57. 227 La. 347, 79 So.2d 333 (1955). Defendant in a tort action pending
in federal court sought a declaration of non-liability in state court.
58. In the federal system this would appear to be a factor in determining
whether a court should entertain the suit but not necessarily abuse per se.
Weinstein v. Williams-McWilliams Indus., Inc., 313 F. Supp. 876 (D.C. Del.
1970).
59. 232 La. 1059, 95 So.2d 825 (1957).
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it applicable in two different situations: 60 On one set of facts
it is an exclusive remedy, on the other an alternative remedy.
This dual nature is effectuated by the further relief clause of
article 1871 conferring jurisdiction to render declaratory judg-
ments "whether or not further relief is or could be claimed."' '0
Thus, a court can grant a declaratory judgment where no other
remedy is available, and also when the declaratory remedy is
alternative: "Alternative (1) indicates the possibility of a com-
bination of prayers; (2) the possibility of alternative actions
and prayers, . . .,,"8 As a consequence of this alternative nature,
the fact that other relief is prayed for along with the declaratory
prayer should not constitute a bar to the declaration. Con-
versely, the prayer for the declaration should not preclude the
other relief requested. 83 The relief may be declaratory or execu-
tory or both. 4
So long as a declaratory judgment is prayed for alone or is
prayed for in the alternative, the Louisiana courts have little
problem dealing with this area. 5 Likewise, when an injunction
is sought along with a declaratory judgment, no problems have
arisen with the combination of the prayers. 6 However, when
a declaratory judgment and a money judgment were sought in
conjunction with each other, the only Louisiana court to con-
sider the matter held that the scope of the declaratory judg-
ments act does not encompass the authority to render a money
judgment. In Burton v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 7 the
court evidently considered the request for a money judgment
60. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
61. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1871: "Courts of record within their respective
jurisdictions may declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether
or not further relief is or could be claimed."
62. E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 338 (1941).
63. See Landers Frary & Clark v. Vischer Prods. Co., 201 F.2d 319 (7th
Cir. 1953), and Petrol Corp. v. Petroleum Heat and Power Co., 162 F.2d 327
(2d Cir. 1947), to the effect that it is commonplace to combine coercive re-
lief with a declaratory judgment and executory relief may be demanded
with declaratory relief.
64. See generally E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 634 (1941).
65. Erath Sugar Co., Ltd. v. Broussard, 120 So.2d 544 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1960).
66. Slicho v. City of New Orleans, 235 La. 305, 103 So.2d 454 (1958);
A to Z Paper Co. v. State Dept. of Educ., 251 So.2d 643 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1971); Osburn Funeral Home, Inc. v. State Bd. of Embalmers, 194 So.2d 185
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1967). While these cases are not authority for the proposi-
tion that declarative and coercive relief can be joined, they are at least
examples of it being done without objection.
67. 152 So.2d 235 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
19721
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
for attorney's fees as part and parcel of the declaratory prayer.
A reading of the case plainly indicates that the plaintiff requested
declaratory relief to ascertain the liabilities of his insurers and
also requested that he be awarded attorney's fees. Obviously,
the plaintiff combined a prayer for declaratory relief with a
prayer for a money judgment. The prayers did not overlap. The
declaration requested covered the contractual obligation of the
insurer to defend the insured. The money judgment requested
was for expenses suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the
insurer's refusal to perform as called for in the contract. Neither
remedy taken alone gave the plaintiff complete relief. The only
logical basis for the decision in Burtones is that an action is tied
to one form of relief, and that an action can only result in one
form of recovery. This view appears to be incorrect in light of
the language of Code of Civil Procedure articles 1871 and 862.61
If under article 1871 a plaintiff can combine prayers for relief
and under article 862 a plaintiff shall receive the relief to which
he is entitled, then the granting of both declaratory and execu-
tory relief in one action would appear to be proper.
In Brown v. Mayfield,70 involving a prayer for petitory relief
and a declaratory judgment, the court held that a prayer for
a declaratory judgment which presents no issue in addition to
the petitory aspect does not entitle the plaintiff to a declaratory
judgment. This holding appears to be correct in principle. If
an issue is fully and effectively adjudicated by one of the
remedies prayed for, then granting of the other remedy serves
no useful purpose. However, a traditional remedy, which operates
in the present or the immediate future, will not as fully adju-
dicate an issue as will a declaratory judgment which fixes the
parties rights as to the future. Where declaratory relief is prayed
for in conjunction with other relief, the court should always
assure itself that one form of relief will completely adjudicate
the issue; if so, then only that relief should be granted. How-
ever, if one remedy will not suffice then both should be granted
to the extent justified.
68. Id.
69. LA. CODS CIv. P. art. 862: "Except as provided in Article 1703, a final
judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is
rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his
pleadings and the latter contain no prayer for general and equitable relief."
70. 45 So.2d 912 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950).
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Supplemental Relief
Article 1878 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
"Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may
be granted whenever necessary or proper." This provision is to
be distinguished from the other further relief clause in article
1871, which permits the granting of declaratory relief in situa-
tions where conventional relief would also be appropriate. 71
The provision of article 1878 deals with the effectuation of a
declaratory judgment where a party has chosen to ignore it,
or a declaratory judgment has proved inadequate. Thus, article
1878 provides a basis for petitioning a court for executory or
coercive relief based on a prior declaratory judgment where
such relief is necessary or proper. The further relief should
extend to awarding money judgments as well as injunctive
relief where justified.72 The decision in Burton v. Lumbermen's
Mutual 8 recognized that supplemental relief could extend to
money judgments by stating that while the Declaratory Judg-
ments Act does not encompass the authority to render money
judgments, a declaratory judgment can form a proper basis
for an action to recover damages in a subsequent action under
article 1878. In Schreiner v. Weil Furniture Co.,74 the plaintiff
on appeal prayed that the declaratory judgment be amended
so as to grant specific performance or money damages. Ap-
parently, the request for executory relief was based on the
declaratory judgment awarded plaintiff in trial court, thus in
effect presenting a demand for supplemental relief. The appel-
late court upheld the grant of declaratory relief, but refused
executory relief on the basis of lack of a justiciable controversy
without dealing with the issue of supplemental relief as such.
Womack v. Sternberg5 involved an exchange of property in
which plaintiff sued for and obtained a declaratory- judgment,
71. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
72. In the federal system a money judgment can properly be based on
a declaratory judgment, Texasteel Mfg. v. Seaboard Sur., 158 F.2d 90 (5th
Cir. 1946).
73. 152 So.2d 235 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
74. 68 So.2d 149 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1953). The court did not identify
the procedure under which they considered the request for damages. Exec-
utory relief was refused where plaintiff failed to show that defendant had
not conformed to the agreement as interpreted in the declaratory judgment
because demand for performance had not been made under the contract
after interpretation.
75. 162 So.2d 119 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964), aff'd, 247 La. 566, 172 So.2d 683
(1965). The supreme court decision did not touch upon declaratory relief,
treating only the breach of contract and damage aspects.
19721
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW (Vol. 33
and on rehearing amended his petition to seek damages. Defen-
dant argued on appeal that the award of damages was a grant
of supplemental relief pursuant to article 1878 and was improper
because article 1878 requires that supplemental relief be peti-
tioned for by rule to show cause. The court agreed that article
1878 seemed to require this, but since defendant had not been
prejudiced the award was allowed to stand. The thrust of this
meager quantity of jurisprudence is that the terms of article
1878 will apparently be given effect by the courts.
Parties
Indispensable parties in an action for a declaratory judg-
ment16 are determined by the criteria of article 641.77 However,
article 1880 governing parties in an action for a declaratory
judgment can be read7s so as to extinguish the distinction of
articles 641-4271 between indispensable and necessary parties.
76. In the following cases parties have been held to be indispensable:
Board of Comm'rs for Atchafalaya Basin Levee Dist. v. St. Landry Parish
School Bd., 242 La. 285, 136 So.2d 44 (1961) (federal government held to be
an indispensable party in suit over payment for expropriation where the
federal government was to eventually bear the cost); Humble Oil & Ref.
Co. v. Jones, 241 La. 661, 130 So.2d 408 (1961) (lessors held to be indispens-
able parties in a suit to resolve a unitization problem); Horn v. Skelly Oil
Co., 221 La. 626, 60 So.2d 65 (1952) (holder of mineral reservation held to be
an indispensable party to a suit to determine ownership of % of mineral
rights); Warner v. Clarke, 232 So.2d 99 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970) (landowner
indispensable party to a suit to have certain land declared subject to publio
use); Consolidated Credit Corp. v. Forkner, 219 So.2d 213 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1969) (first mortgagee held to be indispensable party to a suit to determine
how the proceeds of the sale of the judgment debtor's home would be dis-
tributed).
77. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 641: "Indispensable parties to an action are
those whose interest in the subject matter are so interrelated, and would
be so directly affected by the judgment, that a complete and equitable
adjudication of the controversy cannot be made unless they are joined in
the action.
"No adjudication of an action can be made unless all indispensable
parties are joined therein."
78. LA. CODS CIv. P. art 1880: "When declaratory relief is sought, all
persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which could
be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights
of persons not parties to the proceeding. In a proceeding which involves
the validity of a municipal ordinance or franchise, such municipality shall
be made a party, and shall be entitled to be heard. If the statute, ordinance,
or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, the attorney general of the
state shall also be served with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to
be heard." (Emphasis added.) The word shall makes the requirement of
the article mandatory, hence the party would be indispensable in all cases.
79. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 642: "Necessary parties to an action are those
whose interest in the subject matter are separable and would not be directly
affected by the judgment if they were not before the court, but whose
joinder would be necessary for a complete adjudication of the controversy.
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The criteria remain the severability of the interest and the
degree to which a judgment would affect the interest as pro-
vided in articles 641-42. The court made this clear in Humble
Oil & Refining Co. v. Jones by using the traditional criteria to
determine whether or not parties are indispensable. 80 In Parker
v. Tillman,81 where the court granted a request to interpret an
employment contract, the court refused to declare a party claim-
ing an interest indispensable since his interest was not directly
affected and he was not bound by the judgment.
Although article 1880 does not destroy the distinction be-
tween indispensable parties and necessary parties, it does give
wide latitude to a court to require joinder or impleading of
parties. Failure or inability to join affected persons might well
constitute grounds for discretionary refusal to render a declara-
tory judgment even where the party is not indispensable, if
without him a declaratory judgment would not terminate the
controversy.
Article 1880 further provides that when the validity of an
ordinance or franchise is called into question, the municipality
is an indispensable party; if a statute, ordinance, or franchise
is alleged to be unconstitutional, then the attorney general is an
indispensable party. The courts have generally given effect to
these terms.8 2
Pleading
Since an action for a declaratory judgment is an ordinary
action governed by the rules regulating such actions, it follows
that pleading differs in no material aspect from pleading in any
other ordinary action.88 Thus, article 85484 applies, and no tech-
nical forms of pleading are required.8 5
"An adjudication of an action may be made even If all necessary parties
are not joined therein, but when timely objection is made to the nonjoinder
of a necessary party the court shall require his joinder if he Is subject to its
jurisdiction."
80. 241 La. 661, 130 So.2d 408 (1961). The court applies LA. CoDE CIv. P.
arts. 641 and 642 in determining whether parties are indispensable in an
action for a declaratory judgment.
81. 228 La. 214, 81 So.2d 866 (1955).
82. Osburn Funeral Home Inc. v. State Bd. of Embalmers, 194 So.2d
185 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967).
83. Of. LA. CODM Civ. P. art. 1871, comment.
84. LA. CoOS Crv. P. art. 854.
85. Bee Poynter v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 140 So.2d 42 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1962).
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Conclusion ,
The use of declaratory relief in Louisiana was greatly
hampered by the view set forth in Burton v. Lester that declara-
tory relief was an extraordinary remedy to be refused where
another adequate remedy existed. This view was overruled
legislatively in 1960, but since that time there has been no
noticeable increase in the use of declaratory judgments perhaps
because of Burton's continuing detrimental influence.
The remedy offers significant advantages over other forms
of relief, particularly with respect to situations involving inter-
pretation of contracts, documents and legislation by permitting
judicial determination of rights and relations before disruption
of the status quo. With the many possible applications of declara-
tory relief, the practicing bar should acquaint themselves with
the device so that the most efficient legal service can be ren-
dered to the public.
Wilson R. Ramshur
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